

TOP SECRET

File

21 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Results of USIB Meeting This Morning

1. After a lengthy discussion it was decided that in view of the times of preparation of SNIE 11-19-62 and the supplement to the joint evaluation of Soviet missile threat in Cuba, it would be undesirable to attempt to revise the latter to make it conform to the former. The GMAIC report had already been distributed to its recipients and, furthermore, was based on information that was three days old. In addition, the comment in the SNIE was based on a previous GMAIC report and was for estimative purposes rather than to provide finite technical detail. It was agreed that if the question arose, these differences would be pointed out to our principals and that it was not in fact a matter of great difference. We must continue to look to the GMAIC report as amended each day to give us the current operational readiness status of the missile sites, always remembering that these will be subject to the latest read-out provided by Lundahl and the fact that the analysis is based on information which is 48-72 hours old.

2. The Board of National Estimates was instructed to produce a special estimate as to various situations that might occur, and Soviet reaction thereto, after a strike against the missile bases. It was agreed that in the absence of planned courses of action, they would have to make their own assumptions as to such courses.

3. Continued security precautions were urged in order to prevent large-scale, world-wide alert procedures going into effect. It was mentioned that such procedures could even trigger a pre-emptive attack. USIB decided to keep field notification to the barest minimum until after the President had made his talk. Additionally, the problem of reduction in the tight security controls was discussed and it was apparent that the Department of State had lifted these controls to the extent of bringing in a number of Assistant Secretaries over and above those cleared at the

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

White House. General Carroll in particular is hurting on this but appears to be hewing to the line as closely as possible.

4. We decided that there was a need for a black list of Cuban Communist leaders so that in the event we do invade the island, we will be able to put the finger on those people who must be rounded up the soonest. I will have DD/P and DD/I get on this.

5. We directed GMAIC and JAEIC to prepare a sanitized version of their current report plus supplements. This will be considered at 2:00 this afternoon by USIB. It is essential that we protect our

[redacted] COMINT, and KEYHOLE sources -- it was agreed that we could still give a most meaningful presentation at the Top Secret level and perhaps even less, which would be suitable for briefings of the Latin American Ambassadors, the quadripartite Ambassadors, the NATO Council, and others. We will also sanitize this to ensure that the thrust is against Cuba and Castro rather than the Soviet Union.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED